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Summary. This paper aims to identify the cost characteristics of exiting firms
whenever firms are playing an infinite horizon supergame with time-invariant
cost and demand functions. With more than two firms, the problem of which
firms exit is quite similar to a coalition formation one. Solving this coalition
formation problem, we obtain that the exiting firms are those with higher
average cost functions whenever reentry is costless while, whenever reentry is
unprofitable, the exiting firms are those with lower marginal (and possibly
average) cost functions. Since reentry costs are typically sunk, our analysis
points out that the presence of sunk costs aects not only the size (as it is well
known) but also the composition of the industry.
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1 Introduction
In markets where firms dier as to their cost functions is it possible to predict
what are the cost characteristics of the firms which stay or which exit? In
perfectly competitive markets, one can predict that the firms exiting the
market are those with highest average costs. Furthermore, for markets with
few competitors, this prediction has been extended by Ghemawat and
Nalebu (1985, 1990) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) to the case of de-
clining industries. Indeed, using a war of attrition framework, these authors
have shown that the less ecient firm will be the first to exit1. However it is
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1 For instance, Ghemawhat and Nalebu (1985) show that in a war of attrition with complete
information where firms dier according to their capacities, the biggest firm is the first to exit.
Since these authors assume that firms incur only a flow maintenace cost which is proportional to
their capacity, the largest one has the highest average cost function.
well known that, with imperfect competition, exit can occur in a wide variety
of circumstances [see chapters 8 and 9 in Tirole (1988) and Wilson (1992)]. It
is then natural to ask whether the above prediction continue to hold in
imperfectly competive markets where firms are not engaged in a war of
attrition.
We consider an infinite horizon supergame with discounting, referred to
as the production game, played by a set of N firms. Although our results will
hold for an arbitrary number of firms, we shall simplify the exposition by
assuming that the production game involves only three firms. At each
period, firms play a two-stage game where, at the first stage, firms decide
simultaneously to stay in or to stay out of the market and, at the second
stage, active firms (those which have decided to stay in the market) play a
usual Cournot game while the others produce nothing. The discount factor
is common to all firms and suciently close to one. Note also that the
production game will not belong to the class of the war of attrition game
since we shall suppose that the market demand and the cost functions are
time invariant.
Firms dier according to their limited production capacity as well as to
their cost function. We suppose that firms can be ranked according to both
their average and marginal cost functions. These rankings may however
dier since dierences among firms’ fixed costs are allowed. Furthermore,
whenever a firm has decided to stay out of the market at some period, it
incurs a sunk reentry cost if it decides to stay in at some subsequent period.
To simplify the analysis, two cases will be examined, namely, the case where
reentry is costless and the one where the reentry cost is so large that no firm
will find profitable to reenter. Note immediately that, with costless reentry,
the production game is simply an infinitely repeated game while, with un-
profitable reentry, it looses this repeated game structure (the decision to stay
in or to stay out of the market at date t will aect the instantaneous profit
function at subsequent periods).
Exit can obviously occur in our framework. We say that a cartel, i.e. a
subset of the set of firms, is feasible whenever there exists an equilibrium of
the production game where only the members of that cartel stay in the
market along the equilibrium path. For the sake of generality we shall
suppose that the grand cartel N is feasible. We shall also require that the
market cannot be monopolized, that is, no one-firm cartel is feasible. On the
other hand, it will be easy to verify that, for a discount factor close to one,
the two-firm cartel fi; jg is feasible if and only if firm k’s cost function is such
that firm k’s minimax payo in the Cournot game with all firms being active,
vkN, is strictly negative. Accordingly, many two-firm cartels can be feasible
at the same time.
At this point, some important remarks must be made. First, for any
demand and firms’ cost functions there corresponds a set of feasible cartels.
Accordingly, since demand and cost functions are taken as given in our
analysis, so is the set of feasible cartels. Second, for a given demand function,
a particular set of feasible cartels is compatible with many vectors of firms’
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cost functions. For instance, if we know that the set of feasible cartels is given
by ffi; jg; fi; kg;Ng, we only know that viN is positive while vjN and
vkN are both strictly negative. This can arise with firm j having a lower or
higher average cost function than firm k’s. Moreover, this is also compatible
with firm k having a higher average cost function than firm j’s because it has
a higher marginal cost function and lower fixed costs, or a lower marginal
cost function and larger fixed costs. Our purpose in this paper is not to
determine the set of firms’ cost functions which give rise to a particular set of
feasible cartels. Our aim will instead be to answer questions like, for instance,
if ffi; jg; fi; kg;Ng is the set of feasible cartels and if firm j has a lower
average cost function than firm k, do we have any reason to think that firm j
will be more likely to stay in the market or, equivalently, do we have any
reason to think that cartel fi; jg is the most likely to form? Remark finally
that such kind of questions is of interest only when there are many feasible
two-firm cartels and cannot therefore be answered with the help of the
production game alone. However, a careful analysis of the production game
will be required to characterize the set of payo vectors which are attainable
for each feasible cartel2 S, hereafter denoted by Va S.
Hence, to obtain a prediction about the cost characteristics of the exiting
firm, we must determine the cost characteristics of the feasible cartel which is
the most likely to form. Problems of coalition formation have been exten-
sively analyzed in a wide literature (see Greenberg (1994) for a survey) where
a variety of methodologies and concepts are proposed. We adopt here an
approach consisting of two steps. First, we shall associate to the production
game a game in coalitional form, denoted by N ; V . The characteristic
function V will associate to each coalition or cartel S a set of payo vectors
V S as follows: For any feasible two-firm cartel S, V S is simply equal to
the set of attainable payo vectors for cartel S,VaS; for the grand cartel N ,
V N will be equal to the set of all equilibrium payo vectors in the pro-
duction game; and, for any cartel S which is not feasible, we take the con-
vention that V S restricts only the payo of the members of S to be equal to
zero. We then use the core of this coalitional form game to define a stable
cartel: Cartel S is said stable if it is feasible and the core of N ; V  has a non-
empty intersection with the set of attainable payo vectors for that cartel,
Va S. Accordingly, a feasible cartel S is stable whenever there exists at least
one attainable payo vector for that cartel which cannot be blocked by any
other cartel. This means intuitively that the members of a stable cartel can
obtain, by staying in the market together, a payo vector at least as large as
any other payo vector they can obtain if the members of another feasible
cartel stay in the market. Hence, stable cartels are the most likely to form.
Note that, starting with the coalition form game N ; V , a non-coopera-
tive approach to the formation of coalition could have been used. This ap-
2 To be quite precise, the set of attainable payo vectors for cartel S is simply the set of all payo
vectors that firms can obtain at (subgame perfect Nash) equilibrium of the production game
where, along the equilibrium path, only the firms in cartel S stay in the market.
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proach consists to define an extensive form negotiation game in the spirit of
the alternating oers model of Rubinstein (1982) and to analyze the subgame
perfect equilibria of this game. Fortunately, a strong relationship between
this non-cooperative approach and the one adopted in this paper has been
recently established in Moldovanu and Winter (1995)’s work by using the
concept of an Order Independent Equilibrium (OIE), that is, a strategy
profile such that, for any specification of the first movers in the sequential
game, it remains an equilibrium and it leads to the same payos. Starting
with a game in coalitional form, these authors have indeed provided a quite
appealing negotiation game for which i payo vectors resulting from OIE
that uses pure stationary strategies belong to the core of the coalitional form
game and, ii for any payo vector in the core of the coalitional form game
there exists an OIE that uses pure stationary strategies that leads to that
payo vector3. Accordingly, a feasible cartel will be stable if and only if it
forms at an OIE (that uses pure stationary strategies) of the Moldavanu and
Winter (1995)’s sequential game. This provides another motivation for our
definition of a stable cartel.
Concerning the three firms case, our main results are: i whenever re-
entry is costless, if the two-firm cartel containing the firms with lower average
cost functions is feasible then either this cartel is the unique stable cartel or
no stable cartel exists; ii whenever reentry is unprofitable, if the two-firm
cartel containing the firms with higher marginal cost functions is feasible
then either this cartel is the unique two-firm cartel which is stable or no stable
cartel exists; iii a sucient condition for a stable cartel to exist is that there
exists a firm which belongs to all feasible cartels. To illustrate these con-
clusions, let us suppose, on the one hand, that the set of feasible cartels is
given by ffi; jg; fi; kg;Ng and, on the other hand, that firm j’s average and
marginal cost functions are lower than firm k’s. According to the above
results, fi; jg is the unique stable cartel whenever reentry is costless or, in
other words, the firm with the highest average cost function, firm k, is the
most likely to exit the market. In this case, we find back the prediction
obtained in perfectly competitive markets as well as in declining industries.
However, whenever reentry is unprofitable, our results state that fi; kg is the
unique two-firm cartel which is stable4. This means that, whenever reentry is
unprofitable, the firm with a lower marginal and average cost function, firm
j, will be the more likely to exit the market. This sharply contrasts with the
prediction obtained for the costless reentry case.
3 Notice that these results hold if the coalitional form game is superadditive and if every subgame
of the coalitional form game has a non-empty core. Our coalitional game is clearly superadditive.
Furthermore, with three firms, the second requirement will obviously be satisfied whenever the
core of N ; V  is non-empty. For the case of an arbitrary number of firms, a sucient condition
will be given which shall ensure that the core of N ; V  and of its subgames is non-empty.
4 In the case of unprofitable reentry, we cannot generally assert that the grand cartel N is not
stable. This indicates that the possibility of predation does not imply by itself that predation will
eectively occur.
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These conclusions will be generalized to the case of an arbitrary number
of firms. Note furthermore that reentry costs are sunk. Hence, our analysis
points out a novel implication of sunk costs: not only, as it is already well
known from the literature on entry preemption, they can determine the
number of firms in an industry, but they also enter the determination of the
type of firms that stay in a market i.e. the composition of the industry.
The plan of the paper is as follows. We first analyze the case with three
firms. In Section 2 we introduce our assumptions relative to the cost and
demand functions, and we analyse the equilibrium outcomes of the pro-
duction game. In Section 3 we define the game in coalitional form and we
characterize stable cartels for the case of costless reentry and for the case of
unprofitable reentry. The results for the three firms case are extended to the
case with an arbitrary number of firms in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The production game
We consider a supergame, denoted by Ca, involving a set N of firms. Note
immediately that, except in Section 4 where results for an arbitrary number
of firms are provided, we restrict the analysis to the case of three firms. Ca
consists of the infinite repetition of the two-stage game where (i) at the first
stage each firm decides to stay in or to stay out of the market, (ii) at the
second stage the firms which have decided to stay in the market, hereafter
referred to as the active firms, play a usual Cournot game whilst an inactive
firm produces nothing. At each stage decisions are made simultaneously; and
decisions to stay in or to stay out taken at the first stage are perfectly ob-
served by all firms before they choose their production at the second stage.
The scalar a, in the open interval 0; 1, denotes the discount factor common
to all firms. Note also that, for all i 2 N , firm i’s payo in the production
game resulting from the play of a particular strategy profile is defined as the
average discounted sum of the sequence of firm i’s payos in the two-stage
game. Precisely, if a strategy profile leads to a sequence wit1t0 of firm i’s
payos in the two-stage game then firm i’s payo, Pi, in the production game
resulting from the play of this strategy profile is given by 1ÿ aP1t0 atwit.
The purpose of this preparatory section is twofold. On the one hand, we
give a precise content to the concept of a feasible cartel and relate the fea-
sibility of a cartel with the cost and demand functions. On the other hand, for
each feasible cartel S, we characterize the set of all payo vectors that firms
can obtain at subgame perfect Nash equilibria of Ca where along the equi-
librium path only the firms in cartel S stay in the market at each period. This
set is referred to as the set of attainable payo vectors for cartel S.
We shall consider two cases: the case where reentry is costless and the one
where reentry is always unprofitable. Clearly, when reentry is costless Ca is a
repeated game, while Ca looses this repeated game structure whenever re-
entry is unprofitable (the decision to stay in or to stay out of the market at
period t will aect the profit that a firm can obtain at priod t  1). To analyze
these two cases in a unified way we shall introduce auxiliary games. Each of
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these games, denoted by GaS, involves a set S of firms with common dis-
count factor a, and consists of the infinite repetition of a usual Cournot
game. Note that, even if GaN involves the same set of firms than the
production game Ca, these two games dier. Indeed, contrarily to the pro-
duction game Ca, GaN does not allow firms to decide to stay in or to stay
out of the market so that firms’ exit is ruled out in GaN. We shall therefore
refer to GaS as the no-exit game with a set S of firms. Obviously, whether
reentry is costless or unprofitable, there will be a strong relationship between
the set of subgame perfect equilibria of GaS and the set of subgame perfect
equilibria of Ca where along the equilibrium path only the firms in S stay in
the market.
Using these auxiliary games we shall easily obtain a characterization of
the set of attainable payo vectors for each feasible cartel S (see subsec-
tion 2.3 below for the case of costless reentry and subsection 2.4 for un-
profitable reentry), and relate the feasibility of a cartel to the cost functions
(see subsection 2.2). However, before doing this, we introduce our basic
assumptions on the cost and demand functions.
2.1 Assumptions
An active firm has to pay a (time-invariant) fixed cost Fi as well as a variable
cost given by the function cqi; hi; qi where hi and qi are (time-invariant)
firm-specific parameters and qi stands for quantity5. If a firm decides to stay
out, it produces nothing and incurs no cost. Furthermore if a firm, say i, has
decided to stay out at period t ÿ 1, it must pay a reentry cost, Ri, if it decides
to stay in the market at period t. We simplify the analysis by considering in
turn two polar cases, namely, the case where, for all firms, the reentry cost is
so large that reentry is always unprofitable and the one where reentry is
costless.
The variable cost function c depends upon two firm-specific parameters,
hi and qi. The parameter qi stands for the firm i’s capacity constraint and is
thus strictly positive. Accordingly c is only defined for 0  qi  qi. On the
other hand, hi is introduced to rank firms according to their marginal cost
function. We shall indeed suppose that for any quantity q such that the
marginal cost to produce this quantity is well defined for firms i and j, firm
j’s marginal cost is strictly greater than the firm i’s if and only if hj > hi.
More precisely, let Xi  0; qi, we require the following.
Assumption 1 The variable cost function is twice continuously dierentiable
with respect to qi and hi on Xi  R and satisfies a c0; hi; qi  0; 8hi  0;
b 8hi; qi 2 R  Xi, 0  @cqi; hi; qi=@qi  gi <1; and c 8hi; qi 2 R
Xi, @2cqi; hi; qi=@qi@hi > 0.
5 The time index that should be assigned to the quantity variable is omitted as long as this is
unnecessary.
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The average cost function of firm i is denoted by liq, i.e. liq 
cq; hi; qi  Fi=q. To simplify the analysis, we assume that firms can also be
ranked according to their average cost function.
Assumption 2 For any i; j 2 N , either liq > ljq for all q 2 Xi \ Xj, or
liq < ljq for all q 2 Xi \ Xj, or liq  ljq for all q 2 Xi \ Xj.
Now let Q stand for aggregate output. At each period, the inverse
demand function for the homogeneous good, denoted f Q, satisfies:
Assumption 3 For all Q 2 0;Pi2N qi, f is twice continuously dierentiable
with f Q  0 and @f =@Q < 0, for all Q such that f Q > 0.
For an active firm the profit function in theCournot gamewill bewritten as:
piqi;Qÿi  f qi  Qÿiqi ÿ cqi; hi; qi ÿ Fi
where Qÿi  Qÿ qi. Furthermore, for a given set S of active firms, the set of
feasible payo vectors in the Cournot game will be denoted by AS. Pre-
cisely, for any S  N , let X S  i2SXi, we have:
AS  fpii2S j9q 2 X S such that pi  piqi;Qÿi 8i 2 Sg
We shall assume:
Assumption 4 a For all i 2 N , pi is strictly quasi-concave in qi;Qÿi on
Xi  0;
P
j6i qj; b @piqi;Qÿi=@qi  0 for all Qÿi 2 minfqjjj 2 N
and j 6 ig;Pj 6i qj, for all i 2 N ; and c AN \ RjN j 6 ; and AS is
convex for any S  N .
Obviously assumption 4-a, together with the restriction that any active
firm i must choose a quantity in 0; qi and our dierentiability assumptions,
ensures that a Cournot equilibrium exists. Furthermore, assumption 4-b is
a convenient way to impose that capacities are such that at least one firm is
unconstrained at a Cournot equilibrium and this holds even if only two firms
remain active on the market. Note also that, in the first part of assumption
4-c, we require the existence of a strictly positive feasible payo vector
whenever three firms are active. This could be assumed away but it is kept for
the sake of generality since, as we shall see below, this will ensure that there
always exist some equilibria in the production game such that all firms stay in
along the equilibrium path. Finally, the convexity assumption of AS is
introduced for simplicity. It imposes mild restrictions on the demand and
cost functions6.
6 Suppose that S  fi; jg and let Pipj be equal to maxqi2Xi ;qj2Xj piqi; qj subject to
pjqj; qi  pj. Then AS will be convex if and only if Pipj is concave. Now, from concave
programming (see Theorem 4.7 in Beavis and Dobbs, for instance), we know that the concavity
of pi and pj in qi; qj is sucient to ensure the concavity of Pi. Accordingly, any restrictions on
the demand and cost function which ensure that pi is concave in qi; qj are sucient forAS to
be convex. Note however that the convexity ofAS does not prevent firms’ marginal costs to be
constant even if the inverse demand function is linear (see Friedman, 1987, p. 25, for an
example).
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Now let us denote by viS the minimax payo of firm i in the Cournot
game with a set S of active firms. Since, under assumption 3, pi is a de-
creasing function of Qÿi we have
viS  pi qRi
X
j2Sni
qj
0@ 1A;X
j2Sni
qj
0@ 1A
where qRi Qÿi  argmaxqi2Xi piqi;Qÿi. We shall require:
Assumption 5 For any S  N such that jSj  2, viS > 0 8i 2 S.
As we shall see, this assumption will guarantee that the market cannot be
monopolized. It must be noted that assumption 5 requires that any firm’s
capacity is bounded above and that this upper bound is not ‘‘too large’’.
Indeed, if it were not the case then viS would be equal to ÿFi for any S such
that jSj  2 and assumption 5 would be violated.
2.2 Feasible cartels
At the outset, let us define what we call a feasible cartel:
Definition 1 A cartel S  N is said feasible if there exists a subgame perfect
equilibrium r of the production game Ca such that, along the equilibrium path
generated by r, firms in S stay in and firms in N n S stay out of the market.
We shall denote by F the set of feasible cartels. The purpose of this
subsection is to make precise the relationship between the set of feasible
cartels and the cost and demand functions. In order to do this in a simple
way, we shall use the no-exit games defined at the beginning of this Section.
But, before we proceed, it must be immediately noted that an appropriate
version of the Folk Theorem (see Wen, 1994) can be applied to characterize
the set of equilibrium (discounted average) payos7 of the no-exit games. To
be precise, let GaS denote the set of equilibrium payo vectors of the no-
exit game with a set S of firms, GaS. Let furthermore GS denote the set of
feasible and strictly individually rational payo vectors of the Cournot game
where the set of active firms is given by S, that is,
GS  fPii2S 2ASjPi > viS 8i 2 Sg
Then we have from the Folk Theorem that for any P 0 2 GS there exists
a0 < 1 such that P 0 2 GaS for any a 2 a0; 1.
Whenever a tends to 1, an assumption we shall make throughout the
paper, N is a feasible cartel. Indeed, from assumption 4-c, there exists a
payo vector in GaN which gives to all firms a strictly positive payo, that
is, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium of GaN, ~r, leading to a strictly
positive payo for all firms. Obviously, ~r can be used to construct a subgame
7 Given a path qt1t0 in GaS, with qt 2 X S , the resulting discounted average payo of firm i is
1ÿ aP1t0 atpiqit;Qÿit.
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perfect equilibrium r of the production game Ca where all firms stay in the
market at each period along the equilibrium path generated by r. N is
therefore feasible andF is thus always non-empty. On the other hand, note
that assumption 5 ensures that no one-firm cartel belongs to F i.e. that the
market cannot be monopolized8.
We then turn to the condition under which a two-firm cartel is feasible.
A necessary condition for cartel fi; jg to be feasible is that the minimax
payo of the third firm, say k, in the Cournot game with the three firms being
active, vkN, is strictly negative. Indeed, if vkN is non-negative then firm k
will obtain a strictly positive payo at all equilibria of the no-exit game
GaN. It will therefore be impossible to construct an equilibrium in the
production game Ca where firm k stays out of the market along the equi-
librium path. On the other hand, whenever a tends to 1, the condition
vkN < 0 is also sucient for fi; jg to be feasible. Indeed, the minimal payo
firm k can obtain in GaN being strictly negative since it tends to vkN as a
tends to 1, it will therefore be possible to construct an equilibrium of the
production game Ca where firm k stays out of the market along the equi-
librium path. Consequently, whenever a tends to 1, fi; jg is feasible if and
only if vkN < 0. This implies that the feasibility of a two-firm cartel
depends only on the demand and cost functions.
For a given demand function and a given capacity for firms i and j, many
firm k’s cost functions will imply that vkN is strictly negative: some of them
will be characterized by a large fixed cost, Fk, and others will display a large
cost parameter hk9. Remark also that, due to the cost dierences between
firms, a strictly negative vkN does not prevent vjN, for instance, to be
strictly negative. In other words, the feasibility of fi; jg does not exclude the
feasibility of cartel fi; kg. Now, since the demand and cost functions are a
priori given so is the set of feasible cartels. Our analysis will therefore take the
set of feasible cartels as exogeneously given and will aim to determine the
feasible cartel which will be the more likely to form i.e. the set of firms
remaining on the market.
2.3 Equilibrium payos with costless reentry
We now characterize, for each feasible cartel S, the set of all payo vectors
that firms can obtain at subgame perfect equilibria of the production game
Ca where, along the equilibrium path, only the firms in cartel S stay in the
market. We refer to this set as the set of attainable payo vectors for cartel S
and denote it by Va S.
8 Indeed, let r0 be a strategy profile in Ca which specifies that firms j and k stay out of the market
at some period t0. But, if firm j deviates at t0 by deciding to stay in and to produce a quantity
given by its best-reply qRj qi, it will increase its payo by at least vji; j. Then, since vji; j is
strictly positive by assumption 5, r0 cannot be a subgame perfect equilibrium of Ca.
9 For instance, if the demand function writes as Dÿ Q and firm k’s cost function is given by
hkqk  Fk , then fi; jg is feasible whenever hk ; Fk is such that hk  2

Fk
p
> Dÿ qi  qj.
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To begin with, let us consider cartel N . It is quite easy to verify that,
whenever a tends to 1, any subgame perfect equilibrium r of the no-exit game
GaN which gives to any firm i a payo strictly greater than maxf0; viNg10
can be used to construct a subgame perfect equilibrium ~r of the production
game Ca which leads to the same payo vector. Therefore, using the Folk
Theorem, we have that, for any payo vector P 0 which gives to each firm i a
payo strictly greater than maxf0; viNg and which is feasible, i.e.
P 0 2 GN \ RjN j, there exists a0 < 1 such that, for all a 2 a0; 1, P 0 belongs
to VaN. For further references, we shall denote by vaiN the minimal
payo that firm i can obtain in VaN. Note also that the set of attainable
payo vectors for cartel N does not depend on the assumption on the pos-
sibility of reentry.
Consider next a feasible two-firm cartel. We claim that
Claim 1 Let S be a feasible two-firm cartel and let reentry be costless. Then,
1. 8a 2 0; 1,Va S  fPii2N jPii2S 2AS; Pi  maxf0; viNg 8i 2 S; Pj
 0 8j 2 N n Sg ,
2. 8P 0 2 fPii2N jPii2S 2 AS; Pi > maxf0; viNg 8i 2 S; Pj  0 8j 2
N n Sg, there exists a0 < 1 such that, for all a 2 a0; 1, P 0 2Va S.
Let the minimal payo that any member, say i, of a feasible cartel S can
obtain in VaS be denoted by vaiS. Then the point in Claim 1 to be em-
phasized is that vaiS tends to maxf0; viNg if a tends to 1. To see why,
remark first that since reentry is costless any subgame starting at period t  1
is not aected by the decision of a firm to stay out of the market at period t.
In other words, any subgame starting at period t  1 coincides with the
production game Ca except that the payos must be appropriately dis-
counted. This implies that, any firm i’s deviation at period t can be punished
by the play, in the subgame starting at period t  1, of an equilibrium in the
production game Ca which gives to firm i a (discounted average) payo equal
to vaiN. Therefore, if firm i deviates at period 0, it will obtain an average
discounted payo, P di , equal to 1ÿ adi  avaiN, where di stands for the
firm i’s instantaneous profit from the deviation at period 0. Now, whenever a
tends to 1, we have seen that vaiN tends to maxf0; viNg and therefore P di
tends also to maxf0; viNg. Hence, any strategy profile in the production
game Ca leading to a firm i’s payo smaller than maxf0; viNg cannot be a
subgame perfect equilibrium of the production game for any a < 1. Conse-
quently, for all i 2 S, vaiS cannot be smaller than maxf0; viNg for any
a < 1.
Let us now compare the payos that firms can obtain in the set of at-
tainable payos for dierent feasible cartels. To begin with, consider first the
10 Notice that, when viN is strictly negative, there exist equilibria of GaN which give to firm i a
strictly negative payo. This comes from the fact that exit is ruled out in GaN. It is however
obvious that such equilibria cannot be used to construct equilibria of the production game
leading to the same payo.
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payos that firms i and j can obtain in Vai; j and in VaN. Remark
immediately that, at any equilibrium of the production game leading to a
payo vector in Vai; j, firm k stays out of the market at each period and
does not produce anything, while, at any equilibrium leading to a payo
vector in VaN, firm k will produce a strictly positive quantity. This implies
that firms i and j can obtain a larger payo in Vai; j than in VaN.
Moreover, the minimal payo that firm i, resp. j, can obtain inVai; j as well
as in VaN tends to maxf0; viNg, resp. maxf0; vjNg. Consequently,
denoting by @Vai; j the set of undominated payo vectors for firm i
and j in Vai; j i.e. @Vai; j  fP 2Vai; jj 6 9 P 0 2Vai; j such that
P 0i > Pi and P
0
j > Pjg, we have
Lemma 1 Let S be a feasible two-firm cartel and let reentry be costless. Then,
for any P 2VaN there exists P 0 2VaS such that P 0i > Pi for all i 2 S and,
conversely, for any P 2 @VaS there does not exist P 0 2VaN such that
P 0i > Pi for all i 2 N .
Consider next the payos that firms can obtain inVai; j andVai; k. To
begin with, let us denote by Pi p; j the maximal payo that firm i can
obtain in the set of feasible payo vectors Ai; j when firm j’s payo is
given by p, that is,
Pi p; j  maxqi2Xi;qj2Xjfpiqi; qj subject to pjqj; qi  pg
We define Pi p; k in the same way. Let us furthermore denote by q^jqi; p
the minimal quantity that firm j must produce to obtain a payo equal to p
when firm i produces qi, that is, q^jqi; p  minfqjjpjqj; qi  pg. Clearly,
the smaller q^jqi; p is, the larger Pi p; j is. Now, defining q^kqi; p as we do
for firm j, it is easy to see that q^kqi; p > q^jqi; p whenever hj  hk and
Fj < Fk. More generally, if firm j has a lower average cost function than firm
k’s, i.e. lj < lk
11, then q^kqi; p > q^jqi; p and consequently Pi p; k <
Pi p; j. This is what we call the eciency eect: Provided firm i’s partner in
both two-firm cartels receives the same payo p, firm i can obtain a larger
payo by associating with the firm having the lower average cost function.
Remark now that, since fi; jg and fi; kg are supposed feasible, vjN and
vkN are both strictly negative and the minimal payo that firm j, resp. firm
k, can obtain inVai; j, resp.Vai; k, tends to 0 if a tends to 1. This, together
with the fact that Pi is a decreasing function of p, implies that the maximal
payo that firm i can obtain in Vai; j, vMai i; j, tends to Pi 0; j when a
tends to 1. Similarly, vMai i; k tends to Pi 0; k when a tends to 1. We
therefore have
11 Let f : F ! R and g : G! R be real-valued functions. Then, we use the notation f > g to
denote that f x > gx for any x 2 F \ G and similarly, f < g stands for f x < gx for any
x 2 F \ G.
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Lemma 2 Let fi; jg and fi; kg be feasible and let reentry be costless, then there
exists a < 1 such that, for all a 2 a; 1, if lj < lk then (a) vMai i; j > vMai i; k
and (b) 8P 2Vai; k there exists P 0 2Vai; j such that P 0i > Pi and P 0j > Pj.
The second part of the Lemma follows immediately from the first one
since, at any payo vector in Vai; k, firm j obtains a zero payo while it
receives a strictly positive payo at any payo vector in Vai; j
2.4 Equilibrium payos with unprofitable reentry
Since, as noted previously, the set of attainable payo vectors for cartel N
does not depend on the assumption about the possibility of reentry, the first
purpose of this subsection is to characterize the set of attainable payo
vectors for a feasible two-firm cartel. We claim:
Claim 2 Let S be a feasible two-firm cartel and let reentry be unprofitable.
Then,
1. 8a 2 0; 1, VaS  fP jPii2S 2AS; Pi  viS 8i 2 S and Pk  0 8k 2
N n Sg,
2. 8P 0 2 fP jPii2S 2AS; Pi > viS 8i 2 S and Pk  0 8k 2 N n Sg, there
exists a0 < 1 such that, for all a 2 a0; 1, P 0 2VaS.
These two results are obtained by using the no-exit game with a set S of
firms, GaS, which consists of the infinite repetition of the Cournot game
with a set S of active firms. For the ease of exposition, let us consider that
cartel fi; jg is feasible. Then, by assumption 5, we have that the minimal
payo that firms i and j can obtain in the Cournot game with a set fi; jg of
active firms, i.e. vii; j and vji; j, is strictly positive. This implies that firms i
and j will obtain a strictly positive payo at any equilibrium of the no-exit
game Gai; j. Therefore, any equilibrium r0 of the no-exit game Gai; j can
be used to construct an equilibrium ~r of the production game Ca where along
the equilibrium path generated by ~r only firms i and j stay in the market and
which leads to the same payo for firms i and j than the one they obtain at12
r0. Then, since the no-exit game Gai; j is a standard repeated game, we
obtain the second part of Claim 2 by using the Folk Theorem.
The first part of Claim 2 states that the minimal payo that firm i, for
instance, can obtain inVai; j cannot be smaller than vii; j, that is, firm i’s
minimax payo in the Cournot game with a set fi; jg of active firms. To see
this, let us first consider a subgame of the production game Ca which starts at
period 1 and follows the decisions to stay in by firms i and j and to stay out
by firm k. We denote such a subgame by Cfi;jga and we let, for convenience,
the payo in a subgame Cfi;jga be discounted back to period 1. Two remarks
12 In other words, any payo vector P 0 such that P 0k equals zero and P 0i ; P 0j  belongs to the set of
equilibrium payo vectors of the no-exit game Gai; j; belongs to the set of attainable payo
vectors for cartel fi; jg, Vai; j.
654 P. G. Garella and Y. Richelle
must be immediately made about the equilibria of such a subgame. First,
since reentry is unprofitable, a necessary condition for a strategy profile
ri;rj; rk to be a subgame perfect equilibrium of Cfi;jga is that firm k’s
strategy rk specifies that, at each period t  1 and whatever the history at
period t firm k stays out of the market and produces nothing13. Second, since
the minimal (instantaneous) profit that firms i and j can obtain if they stay in,
vii; j and vji; j, is strictly positive by assumption 5, a strategy profile
ri;rj; rk will be a subgame perfect equilibrium of Cfi;jga only if ri and rj
specify that, at each period t  1 and whatever the history at period t, firms i
and j stay in the market. These two remarks lead thus to the conclusion that
any equilibrium r0 of a subgame Cfi;jga can be used to construct an equilib-
rium ~r of the no-exit game Gai; j leading to the same payo for firms i and j
than the one they obtain at r0. As the converse is also true, we obtain that the
set of equilibrium payos that firms i and j can obtain in a subgame Cfi;jga
coincides with the set of equilibrium payo vectors of the no-exit game
Gai; j. This means in particular that the minimal payo that firm i, for
instance, can obtain at an equilibrium of a subgame Cfi;jga is equal to the
minimal payo that firm i can obtain at an equilibrium of Gai; j. We denote
the latter by gaii; j. Note that gaii; j is greater than vii; j for all a and, by
the Folk Theorem, gaii; j tends to vii; j as a tends to 1.
Now, if firm i deviates at period 0 from the quantity specified by an
equilibrium in the production game Ca it can be punished by the play, in the
subgame starting at period 1, of an equilibrium which gives to firm i a payo
equal to gaii; j. Therefore, the minimal payo that firm i can obtain by such
a deviation, P di , is equal to 1ÿ adi  agaii; j, where di stands for firm i’s
instantaneous profit from the deviation at period 0. Hence, since di and
gaii; j are both greater than vii; j, P di is greater than vii; j and the first
part of Claim 2 follows.
The main result provided by Claim 2 is that, with unprofitable reentry,
the minimal payo that a member, say firm j, of a feasible cartel, say fi; jg,
can obtain in the set of attainable payo vectors for that cartel,Vai; j, tends
to its minimax payo in the Cournot game with a set fi; jg of active firms,
vji; j, as a tends to 1. This implies that, whenever a tends to 1, the maximal
payo that firm i can obtain in Vai; j, vMai i; j, tends to Pi vji; j; j with
Pi defined as in the previous subsection, that is,
Pi vji; j; j  maxqi2Xi;qj2Xjfpiqi; qj subject to pjqj; qi  vji; jg
Remark immediately that, since firm j’s fixed costs enter additively in the
right-hand side and the left-hand side of the constraint pjqj; qi  vji; j,
Pi vji; j; j depends only on firm j’s marginal cost parameter hj. Conse-
13 This contrasts sharply with the costless reentry case, since, with costless reentry, an equilibrium
strategy for firm k will generally specify that it reenters on the market along out-of-equilibrium
paths. With unprofitable reentry, the reentry cost is assumed to be large enough for firm k to
always prefer to obtain a zero payo by staying out rather than to reenter on the market by
paying the reentry cost.
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quently, whenever a tends to 1, the comparison between the maximal payo
firm i can obtain in Vai; j and in Vai; k (assuming that fi; kg is also fea-
sible) will only involve a comparison between firm j’s and firm k’s marginal
cost parameter, hj and hk. This provides a first reason for which the un-
profitable reentry case diers from the costless reentry one. Indeed, with
costless reentry the dierence between firm i’s maximal payo inVai; j and
inVai; k depends upon the average cost function of firms j and k while, with
unprofitable reentry, it depends only upon the marginal cost function of firms
j and k.
The unprofitable reentry case diers however from the costless reentry
one in another respect. To see this clearly, let us remark that Pi vji; j; jÿ
Pi vki; k; k can be rewritten as follows:
Pi vji; j; j ÿPi vki; k; k  Pi vji; j; j ÿPi vji; j; k
 
 Pi vji; j; k ÿPi vki; k; k
 
The first term in the right-hand side of this expression is what we have called
the eciency eect. On the other hand, we shall refer to the second term as
the minimax eect. It comes indeed from the dierence between firm j’s
minimax payo vji; j and firm k’s one, vki; k. Obviously, this eect is
negative (positive) whenever vji; j is strictly greater (smaller) than vki; k.
We now show that these two eects works in opposite directions. To do this
in an easy way, let us suppose, without loss of generality (see our above
discussion), that fixed costs of firms j and k are equal. Then, if firm j has a
lower marginal cost function than that of firm k, that is hj < hk, then firm j
has also a lower average cost function than that of firm k, that is lj < lk.
Hence, as we have seen in the previous subsection, the eciency eect will be
positive. On the other hand, hj < hk will also imply that vji; j is strictly
greater than vki; k so that the minimax eect is negative. Consequently, the
dierence between the maximal payo that firm i can obtain inVai; j and in
Vai; k will be determined by the interaction of two opposite eects when
reentry is unprofitable. This contrasts with costless reentry since we have seen
that only the eciency eect matters in this case. The reason is simply that
with costless reentry the minimal payo of firm j and the one of firm k tend
both to zero whenever a tends to 1 so that the minimax eect disappears. We
furthermore prove in the Appendix that the minimax eect dominates the
eciency eect. Hence we have
Lemma 3 Let fi; jg and fi; kg be feasible and let reentry be unprofitable, then
there exists a < 1 such that, for all a 2 a; 1, we have: a vMai i; j < vMai i; k if
and only if hj < hk; and b 8P 2Vai; j there exists P 0 2Vai; k such that
P 0i > Pi and P
0
k > Pk, if and only if hj < hk.
Now the minimax eect will also enter in the comparison of the maximal
payo that firm i can obtain inVai; j, vMi i; j, and inVaN, vMi N. Indeed,
whenever a tends to 1, vMi N tends to Pi 0; 0;N where
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Pi pj; pk;N  maxqi;qj;qk2X Nfpiqi;Qÿi subject to pjqj;Qÿj
 pj and pkqk;Qÿk  pkg:
Accordingly, we can write
Pi vji; j; j ÿPi 0; 0;N  Pi vji; j; j ÿPi vji; j; 0;N
 
 Pi vji; j; 0;N ÿPi 0; 0;N
 
The second term in this expression is the minimax eect which is clearly
negative since vji; j is strictly positive by assumption 5. On the other hand,
we have seen in the previous subsection that the first term is strictly positive.
So, contrarily to what happens with costless reentry, firm i could obtain a
greater payo in VaN than in Vai; j. However this will arise only for
payo vectors in VaN for which firm j’s payo is strictly smaller than
vji; j. Hence, we have
Lemma 4 Let fi; jg be feasible and let reentry be unprofitable. Then, for all P
belonging to @Vai; j there does not exist P 0 belonging to VaN such that
P 0i > Pi and P
0
j > Pj.
3 Stable cartels
The production game defines only the set of payos that are attainable for a
feasible cartel. Hence this game cannot give a prediction about the feasible
cartel which is likely to form since there are in general many feasible cartels.
To obtain such a prediction we are actually confronted with a problem of
coalition formation. Obviously, the formation of coalition has been analyzed
by a large literature (see Greenberg, 1994, for a survey) where a variety of
methodologies and concepts are proposed.
We approach this coalition formation problem in two steps. First, we
shall associate to the production game a game in coalitional form N ; V 
where V is the characteristic function. Taking into account the analysis of the
production game, we shall let V S, for any S 6 N , be equal to either VaS
whenever S is feasible or fP 2 RNjPi  0; 8i 2 Sg whenever S does not belong
to the set of feasible cartel. This means simply that a cartel which is not
feasible can only ensure, on its own, a zero payo for its members while the
members of a feasible cartel S ( 6 N ) can attain on their own any payo
resulting from the play of a subgame perfect equilibrium of Ca characterized
by the fact that all members of S remain on the market along the path
generated by such an equilibrium. We then define V N as the set of
all equilibrium payo vectors in the production game, that is,
V N  [S2FVaS. Let then CN ; V  denote the core of N ; V , that is,
CN ; V   fP 2 V Nj 6 9 S0 and P 0 2 V S0 such that P 0i > Pi 8i 2 S0g
We define a stable cartel as follows:
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Definition 2 A cartel S  N is said stable if it is feasible and VaS, its set of
attainable payo vectors, has a non-empty intersection with CN ; V .
Accordingly, a feasible cartel S is stable whenever there exists at least one
payo vector, P , belonging to the set of attainable payo vector for cartel S
such that there does not exist a feasible cartel S0 and an attainable payo
vector for cartel S0, P 0, which gives to all members of S0 strictly more than
they obtain at P i.e. P 0i > Pi 8i 2 S0. This means intuitively that the members
of a stable cartel can obtain, by staying in the market together, a payo at
least as large as any other payo they can obtain if the members of another
feasible cartel stay in the market. Hence, stable cartels are the more likely to
form.
Although this approach is quite appealing and, as we shall see, quite
powerful, it is worthwhile to note that another kind of motivation for this
definition of a stable cartel can be found in Moldovanu and Winter (1995)’s
work. These authors tackle the problem of coalition formation by defining a
non-cooperative negotiation game in extensive form [which is a generaliza-
tion of the alternating oers model of Rubinstein (1982)] to analyze its
subgame perfect equilibria. More precisely, they analyze a non-cooperative
game of coalition formation based on an underlying game in coalitional form
and define an Order Independent Equilibrium (OIE) as a strategy profile
such that, for any specification of the first movers in the sequential game, it
remains an equilibrium and it leads to the same payos. Assuming that the
underlying game in coalitional form is superadditive, they show that payos
resulting from OIE that use pure stationary strategies belong to the core of
the coalitional form game, and, if the latter game has the property that every
of its subgames has a nonempty core, then for any payo vector in the core
there exists an OIE in pure stationary strategies that leads to that payo
vector. With three firms14, N ; V  satisfies the requirements for these results
to be applied. Consequently, a cartel will be stable if and only if this cartel
will form at a non-cooperative OIE (that uses pure stationary strategies) of
the Moldovanu and Winter’s (1995) sequential negotiation game with the
underlying game in coalitional form being N ; V .
We now turn to the characterization of stable cartels for the case of
costless reentry (subsection 3.1) and of unprofitable reentry (subsection 3.2).
3.1 Stable cartels with costless reentry
Suppose that cost and demand functions are such that at least two firms, say
j and k, can be forced to stay out of the market by their rivals i.e. that fi; jg
and fi; kg are feasible. We have seen in subsection 2.2 that, for a given
demand function, this situation can arise for a large variety of cost functions.
The question is thus to determine the cost characteristics of the firm which is
14 That this will also hold for an arbitrary number of firms is discussed in the next section.
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likely to exit the market or, equivalently, the cost characteristics of the firms
which belong to a stable cartel.
To begin with, let the set of feasible cartels be given by ffi; jg; fi; kg;Ng
and suppose that firm j’s average cost function is lower than firm k’s i.e.
lj < lk. In this case we have established in Lemma 2 that, for any payo
vector P in the set of attainable payo vectors15 for cartel fi; kg, Vai; k,
there exists a payo vector P 0 in Vai; j such that P 0i > Pi and P 0j > Pj. Ac-
cordingly, fi; jg will be able to block any payo vector in Vai; k and no
payo vector in Vai; k belongs to the core of N ; V . In other words, fi; kg
cannot be stable. On the other hand, Lemma 1 implies that cartel N cannot
be stable since, for any payo vector inVaN there exists a payo vector in
Vai; j which gives more to firms i and j. As a consequence, fi; jg is the only
cartel which can be stable, that is, cartel fi; jg is the unique stable cartel
whenever the core of N ; V , CN ; V , is non-empty. Now, for a payo vector
P in Vai; j to belong to CN ; V , it must give to firm i a payo at least as
large as the maximal payo firm i can obtain in Vai; k, vMai i; k. Hence,
denoting by @Vai; j the set of undominated payo vectors for firms i and j
in Vai; j i.e. @Vai; j  fP 2Vai; jj 6 9 P 0 2Vai; j such that P 0i > Pi and
P 0j > Pjg, it is quite easy to verify that the core of N ; V  is simply equal to
fP 2 @Vai; jjPi  vMai i; kg. The core of N ; V  is therefore non-empty since
we have established in Lemma 2 that the maximal payo firm i can obtain in
Vai; j is strictly greater than vMai i; k. It then follows
Proposition 1 LetF  ffi; jg; fi; kg;Ng and let reentry be costless, then there
exists a < 1 such that, for all a 2 a; 1, if lj < lk then fi; jg is the unique
stable cartel.
Let us now consider the case where fj; kg is also feasible i.e.
F  ffi; jg; fi; kg; fj; kg ;Ng and let us suppose that li < lj, li < lk and
lj < lk. Note immediately that, since li < lj, Lemma 2 implies that, for any
payo vector P belonging toVaj; k, there exists a payo vector P 0 inVai; k
such that P 0i > Pi and P
0
k > Pk. Therefore, the core of N ; V  will have an
empty intersection with Vaj; k and, as previously, fi; jg is the only cartel
which can be stable. Now, since fj; kg is feasible and firm k obtains a zero
payo whenever fi; jg forms, firms j and k can block any payo in Vai; j
which does not give to firm j a payo at least as large as vMajj; k. Hence, we
obtain
Proposition 2 LetF  ffi; jg; fi; kg; fj; kg;Ng and let reentry be costless, then
there exists a < 1 such that, for all a 2 a; 1, if li < lj, lj < lk and li < lk
then fi; jg is the unique stable cartel whenever vMai i; k; vMajj; k; 0 2Vai; j
while if vMai i; k; vMajj; k; 0 62Vai; j then no stable cartel exists.
15 To make easier the use of our results (see Lemma 1 to 4) of the previous section, we shall work,
in all what follows, directly with the set of attainable payo vectors for a feasible cartel S,VaS,
instead of V S. This should not create any confusion since only feasible cartel matter for the
analysis and, for each feasible cartel V S VaS.
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These two propositions show that the results for the case of costless
reentry confirm those obtained for the perfect competition case as well as the
war of attrition’s, namely that the firm with the highest average cost function
will exit the market. We now show that this prediction will not hold in
general whenever reentry is unprofitable.
3.2 Stable cartels with unprofitable reentry
To begin with, let us consider the case where the set of feasible cartels is given
by ffi; jg; fi; kg;Ng. We have shown that, with costless reentry, fi; jg is the
unique stable cartel whenever lj < lk. Now, suppose that, in addition to
have a lower average cost function than firm k’s, firm j has also a lower
marginal cost function i.e. hj < hk. Then, from Lemma 3, we know that, for
any payo vector P inVai; j, there exists P 0 inVai; k such that P 0i > Pi and
P 0k > Pk. Hence no payo vector in Vai; j belongs to the core of N ; V  and
cartel fi; jg cannot be stable.
This shows clearly that the prediction about the characteristics of the
exiting firm obtained in the costless reentry case will not hold. This con-
clusion will now be reinforced by showing that fi; kg is a stable cartel.
To begin with, from Lemma 4, if P belongs to @Vai; k (the set of at-
tainable payo vectors for fi; kg which are undominated for firms i and k)
then there does not exist P 0 2VaN such that P 0i > Pi and P 0k > Pk. Ac-
cordingly, to show that fi; kg is stable, it must be shown that for some payo
vector P inVai; k there does not exists a payo vector P 0 inVai; j such that
P 0i > Pi and P
0
k > Pk. But at any payo vector inVai; k, firm j’s payo is zero
so that fi; kg is stable whenever there exists a payo vector in Vai; k which
gives to firm k a payo larger than zero and to firm i a payo larger than its
maximal payo in Vai; j i.e. vMai i; j. Now, from Lemma 3, we know that
vMai i; k is strictly greater than vMai i; j for a suciently close to 1, while firm
k’s minimal payo in Vai; k exceeds vki; k which, by assumption 5, is
strictly positive. Therefore, fP 2Vai; kjPi  vMai i; jg will be non-empty and
is included in the core of N ; V  so that cartel fi; kg is stable.
When the set of feasible cartels is given by ffi; jg; fi; kg;Ng, the un-
profitable reentry case diers from the costless reentry one in another res-
pect. We shall indeed show that, with unprofitable reentry, cartel N can be
stable while, with costless reentry, we have established that fi; jg is the un-
ique stable cartel. To see this, recall the discussion in subsection 2.4 and
remark that firm i’s maximal payo in VaN i.e. vMai N can exceed vMai i; k.
But if vMai N  vMai i; k, any payo vector in @VaN which gives to firm i a
payo at least as large as vMai i; k will belong to the core of N ; V  so that N is
stable. Hence we obtain
Proposition 3 Let F  ffi; jg; fi; kg;Ng, let hj < hk and let reentry be un-
profitable, then there exists a < 1 such that, for all a 2 a; 1, either
vMai N < vMai i; k and fi; kg is the unique stable cartel, or vMai N  vMai i; k and
both fi; kg and N are stable.
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Before we comment on this Proposition, let us consider the case where the
set of feasible cartels is given by ffi; jg; fi; kg; fj; kg;Ng. We have16
Proposition 4 LetF  ffi; jg; fi; kg; fj; kg;Ng, let hi < hj < hk and let reentry
be unprofitable, then there exists a < 1 such that, for all a 2 a; 1, fj; kg is the
unique stable cartel whenever 0; vMaji; j; vMaki; k 2Vaj; k while if
0; vMaji; j; vMaki; k 62Vaj; k then no stable cartel exists.
Three basic conclusions are obtained from the results stated in Proposi-
tion 3 and 4. First, as discussed in subsection 2.2, a two-firm cartel is feasible
whenever the third firm has a suciently high average cost function. This can
arise with this firm having large fixed costs and a low marginal cost function
or a high marginal cost function and large fixed costs. Accordingly, a large
variety of firms’ cost functions can lead to the same set of feasible cartels.
Now, our results show that the determination of which cartel is stable in-
volves only a comparison between firms’ marginal cost function. Conse-
quently, when reentry is unprofitable, firms’ fixed costs only matter for the
determination of the set of feasible cartels. Second, if the firm with the
highest marginal cost belongs to a feasible two-firm cartel, then this firm
belongs to a stable cartel (if such a cartel exists) and will thus remain on the
market. In particular, when all two-firm cartels are feasible, if a stable cartel
exists then the two firms with higher marginal cost functions survive i.e. the
most cost ecient firm can exit the market17. Finally, the possibility of
predation will not imply by itself that predation will occur since we have seen
that N can be stable.
4 An extension: Stable cartels with an arbitrary number of firms
The purpose of this section is that of generalizing the analysis to the case of
an arbitrary number of firms. To begin with, let us define a feasible cartel:
S  N is said feasible if and only if there exists an equilibrium r of Ca and
s < 1 such that, along the path generated by r, at each period t  s all
firms in S stay in and all firms in N n S stay out of the market. To each
feasible cartel, as in the production game of Section 2, is associated a set
16 Since hi < hj < hk , Lemma 3 implies, on the one hand, that for any P inVai; j there exists P 0
in Vaj; k such that P 0j > Pj and P 0k > Pk and, on the other hand, that for any P inVai; k there
exists P 0 in Vaj; k such that P 0j > Pj and P 0k > Pk . In other words, cartel fj; kg can block any
payo vectors which can be proposed by cartels fi; jg and fi; kg. Hence, fj; kg is the only two-
firm cartel which can be stable. Now, for a vector P inVaj; k to be in the core of N ; V , it must
give to firms j and k a payo at least as large as vMaji; j and vMaki; k respectively. Therefore,
fj; kg is stable whenever 0; vaji; j; vaki; k belongs toVaj; k. Finally, it is easy to verify that,
when all two-firm cartels are feasible, cartel N cannot be stable.
17 The condition under which a stable cartel exists when all two-firm cartels are feasible, namely
that 0; vMaji; j; vMaki; k 2Vaj; k, is more likely to be satisfied when hi is small since, as shown
by Lemma 3, a low hi implies low values for vMaji; j and vMaki; k. This also contrasts with the
case of costless reentry where the presence of a firm with high average costs makes it more likely
the existence of a stable cartel.
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Va S of equilibrium payo vectors. Then proceeding as in subsections 2.3
and 2.4, it is easy to verify that the analogue of Claim 1 and Claim 2 writes
as
Claim 3 Let S be a feasible cartel and let reentry be costless. Then,
1. 8a 2 0; 1, VaS  fPii2N jPii2S 2AS; Pi  maxf0; viNg 8i 2 S; Pj
 0 8j 2 N n Sg,
2. 8P 0 2 fPii2N jPii2S 2AS; Pi > maxf0; viNg8i 2 S; Pj  0
8j 2 N n Sg, there exists a0 < 1 such that, for all a 2 a0; 1, P 0 2VaS.
Claim 4 Let S be a feasible cartel and let reentry be unprofitable. Then,
1. 8a 2 0; 1, VaS  fP jPii2S 2AS; Pi  maxf0; viSg 8i 2 S and Pk
 0 8k 2 N n Sg,
2. 8P 02fP jPii2S 2AS; Pi > maxf0; viSg 8i 2 S and Pk  0
8k 2 N n Sg; there exists a0 < 1 such that, for all a 2 a0; 1, P 0 2VaS.
Remark that the only dierence with the three firms case is that viS can
now be negative whenever S 6 N , while with three firms our hypothesis of
non-monopolization (assumption 5) implies that only viN could be nega-
tive. Finally, the game in coalitional form N ; V  is defined as in section 3,
that is, V S  fP 2 RNjPi  0 8i 2 Sg whenever S is not feasible and, for a
feasible cartel S  N ,
V S  [Sh2fZjZS;Z2FgVaSh:
At the outset, we consider the question of the non-emptyness of the core
of N ; V .
Proposition 5 A sucient condition for the core of N ; V  to be non-empty is
that there exists S0 6 ; such that S0  S for all S 2F.
This result (proven in the Appendix) shows that if at least one firm always
finds profitable to remain on the market, then a stable cartel exists18. Note
also that, whenever a is suciently close to 1, this condition reduces simply
to the existence of at least one firm, say i, for which its minimax in the
Cournot game with a set N of active firms, viN, is strictly positive.
We shall denote by S a stable cartel. Remark immediately that if a stable
cartel exists then it has a non-empty intersection with all feasible cartels, that
is, S \ S 6 ; for all S 2F. Indeed, for all P 2VaS, we have that Pi  0
for all i 2 N n S. Hence, if S \ S  ; for some S 2F, then S  N n S and
for all P 2VaS there exists P 0 2VaS such that P 0i > Pi  0 for all i 2 S.
18 In the Appendix, we show that this condition is also sucient to ensure the non-emptyness of
the core of every subgame S; V S of N ; V , where S  N and V S stands for the restriction of V
to the subsets of S. Accordingly, under this condition, we can continue to use Moldovanu and
Winter’s (1995) results to motivate our definition of a stable cartel.
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The core of N ; V  will thus have an empty intersection with VaS, that is,
S will not be stable.
Define then the following vectors of firms’ characteristics. Let the vector
of average cost functions lS  lii2S be ordered in such a way that li  lj
if and only if i < j for all i; j 2 S. In the same way, let hS  hii2S and
qS  qii2S be ordered so that hi  hj and qi  qj if and only if i < j for all
i; j 2 S. Now the following propositions (proven in the Appendix) give a
characterization of stable cartels for the case of costless reentry and for that
of unprofitable reentry.
Proposition 6 Let reentry be costless, then there exists a < 1 such that, for all
a 2 a; 1, if S is stable then we have:
1. if qi  q for all i 2 N , then there does not exist S 2F such that either
jSj < jSj, or jSj  jSj and 19 lS < lS;
2. if qi 6 qj for some i; j 2 N , then there does not exist S 2F such that
jSj  jSj and lS < lS.
Let VS  fPii2N jPii2S 2AS; Pi > maxf0; viSg 8i 2 S; Pi  0 8i 2
N n Sg, then
Proposition 7 Let reentry be unprofitable and suppose that, for any S and S0,
S0  S implies that 8P 2VS there exists P 0 2VS0 such that P 0i > Pi for all
i 2 S0, then there exists a < 1 such that, for all a 2 a; 1, if S is stable then we
have:
1. if qi  q for all i 2 N , then there does not exist S 2F such that jSj  jSj
and hS > hS;
2. if hi  h for all i 2 N , then there does not exist S 2F such that jS n Sj  2,
jSj  jSj and qS n S < qS n S.
Accordingly, whenever capacities are identical across firms, Proposition 6
and 7 provide the same qualitative results than those given in Proposition 1
and 3. This simply follows from the fact that, with identical capacities, part
b of Lemma 2 and 3 naturally extends to the case of an arbitrary number of
firms.
In the case of costless reentry, the presence of dierences in capacities
introduces the following possibility. Consider an example with
N  f1; 2; 3; 4g. Suppose that firm 4 has the largest fixed cost but also the
largest capacity so that f1; 4g is a feasible cartel. If firms 2 and 3 have
suciently small capacities it is possible that neither f1; 2g nor f1; 3g is
feasible while f1; 2; 3g is feasible. Then f1; 4g can be stable since it could be
possible for 1 to obtain more in Va1; 4 than in Va1; 2; 3. Accordingly,
although reentry is costless, dierences in capacities lead to the possibility
that the firm with the highest average cost function remains on the market.
19 For two s-dimensional vectors x and y, x < y means that xi  yi for i  1; :::; s with a strict
inequality for at least one i.
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With unprofitable reentry, we have seen that the characterization of a
stable cartel relies on the firms’ minimax payo in the Cournot game.
However, in the case of an arbitrary number of firms, firm i’ minimax payo,
viS, is given by
viS  pi qRi
X
j2Sni
qj
0@ 1A;X
j2Sni
qj
0@ 1A
and will in general depend upon hi as well as on the vector of capacities. This
explains why in order to extend Lemma 3 to the case of an arbitrary number
of firms the condition that capacities are identical is introduced. Now to
understand the role of capacities when the hs are identical, let us take an
example. Consider a situation where cartels f1; 2; 3g and f1; 4; 5g are feasible
with q2  q3 and q4  q5. Then Proposition 7 tells us that if cartel f1; 2; 3g is
stable then we cannot have q4  q2 and q5  q3 with a least one strict
inequality. To see why it must be so, suppose to the contrary that q4 > q2
and q5  q3. By the definition of firm i’s minimax viS, q5  q3 implies
that v41; 4; 5  F4  v21; 2; 3  F2 while q4 > q2 implies that v51; 4; 5
 F5 < v31; 2; 3  F3. Therefore firm 1’s maximal payo in Va1; 4; 5 is
strictly greater than inVa1; 2; 3 since all firms have the same marginal cost
function and firm 1’s maximal payo in Va1; 2; 3, resp. in Va1; 4; 5, does
not depend upon the fixed cost of firms 2 and 3, resp. 4 and 5. Consequently,
cartel f1; 2; 3g cannot be stable since any payo vector in Va1; 2; 3 will be
blocked by cartel f1; 4; 5g.
Remark incidentally that if, like in Ghemawat and Nalebu (1985), firms’
fixed cost is an increasing function of their capacity while marginal costs are
identical, then the result we obtain with unprofitable reentry goes in the
opposite direction of the one obtained in a war of attrition.
5 Concluding remarks
Using the concept of a stable cartel, we have obtained two predictions on the
cost characteristics of the exiting firms in a infinite horizon production game.
Loosely speaking, whenever reentry is costless, the exiting firms are those
with higher average cost functions while, whenever reentry is unprofitable,
the exiting firms are those with lower marginal cost functions. Accordingly, a
firm with a low average and marginal cost function will be expected to stay in
the market when reentry is costless but will be expected to exit the market
when reentry is unprofitable. Note that reentry costs are sunk costs. Con-
sequently our analysis points out a novel implication of sunk costs, namely,
sunk costs matter for the composition of the industry.
This sharp dierence between the results obtained with costless reentry
and with unprofitable reentry has also been shown to come from the inci-
dence of the assumption about reentry on the minimal payo that a firm can
achieve by staying in the market.
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To see this point clearly, let us consider the three firms case where cartels
fi; jg and fi; kg are the only two-firms cartels to be feasible. Let us further-
more suppose that firm j has lower marginal and average cost functions than
firm k’s. When reentry is costless, the minimal payo of firms j and k will
both tend to zero whenever the discount factor tends to one. The comparison
between the maximal payo that firm i can achieve by remaining on the
market with firm j and the one it can obtain by staying in the market with
firm k will thus rely only upon what we have called the ‘‘eciency eect’’.
This eciency eect tells us simply that, if firms j and k must receive the same
payo when they stay in the market with firm i, then firm i can obtain a
larger payo by staying in with the firm having the lowest average cost
function, that is, firm j. Now, firm j obtains a zero payo when it stays out of
the market while it achieves a strictly positive one by staying in with firm i.
Therefore, firms i and j can both obtain a larger payo by staying together in
the market than the one they can obtain if it is firms i and k which stay in. In
other words, cartel fi; kg cannot be stable.
When reentry is unprofitable we have shown that, as the discount factor
tends to one, the minimal payo that a firm, say j, can obtain by staying in
the market with firm i tends to its minimax payo in the Cournot game
played by firms i and j. This minimax payo20 depends obviously on the
firm’s cost characteristics with two main consequences. First, the maximal
payo that firm i can obtain by staying in the market with firm j will no
longer depend on firm j’s fixed costs. Accordingly, the comparison between
firm i’s maximal payo when it stays in with firm j and when it stays in with
firm k relies only upon dierences among the marginal cost function of firms
j and k. Second, the lower a firm’s marginal cost function is, the larger its
minimax payo is. Hence, since firm j is supposed to have a lower marginal
cost function than firm k, it has also a larger minimax payo. This induces a
‘‘minimax eect’’: everything being equal, firm i can obtain a larger payo by
staying in the market with the firm having the smaller minimax payo. This
eect will therefore work in an opposite direction to the eciency eect
(everything being equal, the lower the marginal cost function is the lower the
average cost function). Moreover we can show that the minimax eect
dominates the eciency eect so that, the maximal payo that firm i can
obtain by staying in with firm j is strictly smaller than the one it can obtain
by staying in with firm k. Now, since firm k will obtain its minimax payo if
it stay in with firm i while it obtains a zero payo if firms i and j stay in the
market, firms i and k will thus obtain a larger payo when they stay together
in the market than the one they can obtain if firms i and j remain on the
market. Consequently, cartel fi; jg cannot be stable.
20 These minimax payos are strictly positive under our assumption of non-monopolization of
the market.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3
To save on notations, let q^hqi, for h 6 i, be equal to
minfqhjphqh; qi  vhi; hg. Accordingly, Pi vhi; h; h is simply equal to
maxqi2Xi piqi; q^hqi.
Note first that the definition of q^hqi and assumptions 1 and 3 imply that,
for h  j; k, we have i q^hqi  qRh qi; ii @phq^hqi; qi=@qh > 0 8qi 2
0; qi; and iii q^hqi is strictly increasing in qi for qi 2 0; qi. Now, from the
definition of qRh qi, we also have that
dqRh qi
dhh
 @
2cqRh qi; hh; qh=@qh@hh
@2phqRh qi; qi=@q2h
which is strictly negative. Hence, q^jqi  qRj qi > qRk qi  q^kqi if and only
if hj < hk. On the other hand, for any qi 2 0; qi, it is easy to verify that
dq^hqi
dhh
 @cq^hqi; hh; qh=@hh ÿ @cq
R
h qi; hh; qh=@hh
@phq^hqi; qi=@qh
Note that, for any qi 2 0; qi, the denominator of this expression is strictly
positive from property ii above while the numerator is strictly negative
since, by property iii above, q^hqi < q^hqi  qRh qi and @2cqh; h; qh=
@qh@hh has been supposed strictly positive in assumption 1. Therefore, for all
qi 2 0; qi, dq^hqi=dhh is strictly negative.
We thus obtain that, for all qi 2 0; qi, q^jqi > q^kqi if and only if
hj < hk. Furthermore, since pi is a decreasing function of Qÿi, we have that,
for all qi 2 0; qi, piqi; q^jqi < piqi; q^kqi if and only if hj < hk. The re-
sult stated in the part a of the Lemma then follows from the definition of
Pi and the application of the Folk Theorem.
Proof of Proposition 5
Let vM S0; S be such that, for all P 2VaS,
P
i2S0 Pi  vM S0; S with S0
being such that if S 2F then S0  S. Now, since F is clearly finite, there
exists S 2F such that vM S0; S  vM S0; S 8S 2F. We claim that S is
stable.
Suppose to the contrary that S is not stable, that is, that 8P 2VaS
there exists S0  N and P 0 2VaS0 such that P 0i > Pi 8i 2 S0. Clearly such
S0 must be feasible and therefore, by assumption, S0  S0. Hence, if S
is not stable then for some S0 2F and P 0 2VaS0 we have thatP
i2S0 P
0
i > v
M S0; S. But this contradicts the definition of S.
This kind of argument can easily be used to show that, as claimed in
footnote 18, the condition of the Proposition is sucient for every subgame
S; V S of N ; V , where V S stands for the restriction of V to all subsets of S,
to have a non-empty core.
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Proof of Proposition 6
We first prove that there exists a < 1 such that, for all a 2 a; 1, if S is stable
then there does not exist S 2F with S \ S 6 ; and jSj  jSj such that
lS < lS. This comes from the following.
Lemma 5 Suppose that reentry is costless. If S; S0 are feasible with jSj  jS0j,
S \ S0 6 ; and lS0 < lS then there exists a < 1 such that, for all a 2 a; 1
and for all P 2VaS, there exists P 0 2VaS0 such that P 0i > Pi 8i 2 S0.
Proof. a Let D  f0; 1; :::; dg with d  jS n S0j and let d 2 D. Then define Sd
as follows:
i S0  S
ii Sd  Sdÿ1 n fhdg  [ fldg with ld 2 S0 n S; hd 2 S n S0 and d  1
Obviously Sd  S0 and fSdgd2D is a sequence of subsets of N which starts
from S and converges to S0. Remark also that Sd n Sdÿ1  fldg,
Sdÿ1 n Sd  fhdg and jSd j  jSdÿ1j for any d  1. Furthermore, since
lS0 < lS by assumption, then lS0 n S < lS n S0 and therefore there
exists a sequence f~Sdgd2D such that, for all d  1, lld  lhd with a strict
inequality for a least one d. As a consequence, we have that l~Sd < l~Sdÿ1
for any d  1.
Now, for any d 2 D, let us define Vc~Sd as follows:
Vc~Sd  fPii2N jPii2~Sd 2A~Sd; Pi  08i 2 N n ~Sd ;
Pi  maxf0; viNg8i 2 ~Sdg
Note immediately that since S and S0 are feasible then, 8i 2 N n S \ S0,
viN  0 and hence maxf0; viNg  0. This implies that there exist payo
vectors in Vc~Sd, resp. in Vc~Sdÿ1, such that Pld  0, resp. Phd  0.
b Then we can proceed as in the discussion preceding Lemma 2 to
establish that, for all d  1, we have that for all P 2 Vc~Sdÿ1 there exists
P 0 2 Vc~Sd such that P 0i  Pi 8i 2 ~Sd whenever lld  lhd and P 0i > Pi
8i 2 ~Sd whenever lld < lhd. Since the latter holds for at least one d,
we therefore obtain that 8P 2 VcS there exists P 0 2 VcS0 such that
P 0i > Pi for all i 2 S0. Consequently, by continuity, we have that 8P 2
fP 2 VcSjPi > maxf0; viNg 8i 2 Sg there exists P 0 2 fP 2 VcS0jPi >
maxf0; viNg 8i 2 S0g such that P 0i > Pi 8i 2 S0 and the result then follows
from the application of the Folk Theorem.
It just remains to prove that, whenever qi  q for all i 2 N , there exists
a < 1 such that, for all a 2 a; 1, if S is stable then there does not exists
S 2F such that jSj < jSj. Let S^s be such that jS^sj  s and, for all
i 2 S^s, li < lj 8j 2 N n S^s. Now the assumption that qi  q for all i 2 N
implies that viS [ fig  piqRi jSjq; jSjq and consequently if S with jSj  s
is feasible then S^s is also feasible. Furthermore, if there exists S 2F with
jSj  s < s  jSj then S^s 2F and S^s  S^s. Therefore, by Lemma 5,
there exists a < 1 such that, for all a 2 a; 1, if S is stable then S  S^s
and, consequently, if in addition there exists S 2F such that jSj < jSj then
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S^s  S. The result then follows since, with costless reentry, it is clear that if
S, S0 are feasible with S0  S then there exists a < 1 such that for all a 2 a; 1
and 8P 2VaS, there exists P 0 2VaS0 such that P 0i > Pi 8i 2 S0.
Proof of Proposition 7
1. Remark first that the assumption that, for any S and S0, S0  S implies that
8P 2VS there exists P 0 2VS0 such that P 0i > Pi for all i 2 S0, entails
immediately that if S is stable then no feasible cartel is included in S or,
equivalently, that viS  0 8i 2 S.
We then extend Lemma 3 as follows:
Lemma 6 Suppose that reentry is unprofitable and qi  q 8i 2 N . Then, for any
S and S0 such that viS  0 8i 2 S; viS0  0 8i 2 S0; jSj  jS0j; S \ S0 6 ;;
and hS < hS0 we have: a for all P 2VS there exists P 0 2VS0 such
that P 0i > Pi for all i 2 S0 and b if in addition S and S0 are feasible then there
exists a < 1 such that, for all a 2 a; 1 and for all P 2VaS, there exists
P 0 2VaS0 such that P 0i > Pi for all i 2 S0.
The proof of these results follows quite closely the one of Lemma 5 and is
therefore omitted. Note that this Lemma implies that, for a suciently close
to one, if S is stable then, whenever qi  q, there does not exists S 2F such
that viS  0 8i 2 S, jSj  jSj and hS > hS.
Hence, to obtain the result stated in the first part of Proposition 7, it
remains to prove that there exists a < 1 such that, for all a 2 a; 1, if S is
stable then there does not exist S 2F such that viS < 0 for some i 2 S,
jSj  jSj, S \ S 6 ; and hS > hS. Note that if S is feasible and
viS < 0 for some i 2 S then there exists S0 2F such that S0  S and
viS0  0 for all i 2 S0. Furthermore, since S is stable and S0 is a feasible
cartel, we have that S \ S0 6 ;. Then, since hS > hS, there exists
S00  S (with S00 62F) such that viS00  0, jS00j  jS0j, S00 \ S0 6 ; and
hS0 > hS00. Now, by the first part of Lemma 6, we obtain that,
8P 00 2VS00 there exists P 0 2VS0 such that P 0i > P 00i for all i 2 S0 while, by
assumption, we have that 8P  2VS there exists P 00 2VS00 such that
P 00i > P

i for all i 2 S00. Consequently, 8P  2VS there exists P 0 2VS0
such that P 0i > P

i for all i 2 S0 and the result follows from the Folk Theorem.
2. We first prove that, under the assumptions of Proposition 7-2, there
exists a < 1 such that, for all a 2 a; 1, if S is stable then there does not exist
S 2F such that viS  0 for all i 2 S; S \ S 6 ;; jSj  jSj; jS n Sj  2;
and qS n S > qS n S. This is an immediate consequence of the following.
Lemma 7 Suppose the assumptions of Proposition 7-2 hold. For any S and S0
such that viS0 8i 2 S; viS00 8i 2 S0; S \ S0 6 ;; jSj  jS0j; jS n S0j  2;
and qS n S0 > qS0 n S we have: a for all P 2VS there exists P 0 2VS0
such that P 0i > Pi 8i 2 S0; and b if in addition S and S0 are feasible then there
exists a < 1 such that, for all a 2 a; 1 and for all P 2VaS, there exists
P 0 2VaS0 such that P 0i > Pi 8i 2 S0.
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Proof. First of all, for all S and S0 satisfying the requirements of the Lemma
and for all Q 2 0;Pk2S\S0 qk, let us define the following.
Q^S n S0; qS n S0;Q
 min
qii2SnS0
X
i2SnS0
qi s:t: pi qi;Q
X
j2SnS0ni
qj
0@ 1A  viS 8i 2 S n S0
8<:
9=;
where viS  piqRi 
P
j2Sni qj;
P
j2Sni qj and qRi Qÿi  argmaxqi piqi;Qÿi.
It must be immediately noted that if qS n S0  qS0 n S then
Q^S n S0; qS n S0;Q  Q^S0 n S; qS0 n S;Q21. Furthermore, using the en-
velope theorem and denoting by ki the Kuhn and Tucker multiplier associ-
ated to the constraint pi  viS, we have, for any i 2 S n S0,
dQ^S n S0; qS n S0;Q
dqi

X
k2SnS0ni
kk
@vkS
@qi
Accordingly, since jS n S0j is assumed to be greater or equal to 2, dQ^=dqi is
strictly negative. Hence if S and S0 are such that qS n S0 < qS0 n S then
Q^S n S0; qS n S0;Q > Q^S0 n S; qS0 n S;Q for all Q 2 0;Pk2S\S0 qk.
Therefore, since pk is strictly decreasing in Qÿk, we have that, for all
k 2 S \ S0 and all qkk2S\S0 2  k2S\S0Xk,
pk qk;
X
l2S\S0nk
ql
0@  Q^ S n S0; qS n S0; X
l2S\S0
ql
 !!
< pk qk;
X
l2S\S0nk
ql  Q^ S0 n S; qS0 n S;
X
l2S\S0
ql
 !0@ 1A
The first part of Lemma 7 then follows by continuity of pi and this in turn
leads, by using the Folk Theorem, to the second result stated in the Lemma.
Now, to complete the proof of Proposition 7, it remains to prove that
there exists a < 1 such that, for all a 2 a; 1, if S is stable then there does
not exist S 2F such that viS < 0 for some i 2 S; S \ S 6 ;; jSj  jSj;
jS n Sj  2; and qS n S > qS n S. Suppose to the contrary that there
exists S satisfying these requirements. Since S is feasible and viS < 0 for
some i 2 S, then there exists S0 2F such that S0  S and viS0  0 8i 2 S0.
Note also that if S is stable then S has a nonempty intersection with
any feasible cartel and, in particular, S \ S0 6 ;. Furthermore, since
qS n S > qS n S0, there exists S00  S (with S00 62F) such that
jS00j  jS0j; S00 \ S0 6 ; and qS0 n S00 > qS00 n S0. Therefore, using Lemma 7,
we have that 8P 00 2VS00 there exists P 0 2VS0 such that P 0i > P 00i 8i 2 S0.
Furthermore, by assumption, we also have that 8P  2VS there exists
21 This follows from the facts that the constraints in the minimization problem are binding at a
solution so that fixed costs do not aect Q^ and that we have assumed that hi  h 8i 2 N .
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P 00 2VS00 such that P 00i > P i 8i 2 S00 and consequently, 8P  2VS there
exists P 0 2VS0 such that P 0i > P i 8i 2 S0. Then, using the Folk Theorem,
we have that there exists a < 1 such that, for all a 2 a; 1 and for all
P  2VaS, there exists S0 2F and P 0 2VaS0 such that P 0i > P i 8i 2 S0
which contradicts the fact that S is stable.
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